Dr. Seyed Abdul Amir Nabavi
Faculty member of the Department of Comparative Studies, Institute of Cultural and Social Studies
Conducting the presidential elections in June 2021 has once again created a debate about the future direction of Iran's foreign policy, as the same debate had been founded in previous elections of Iran, both the President and the parliament. As was experienced in 1992, this time too, most of the comments and speculations are about the JCPOA and how Iran will cooperate with international institutions and major world powers.
On the other hand, some analysts, considering the composition of the presidential candidates and their slogans, see the future of the negotiations for the revival of JCPOA and reaching an agreement as bleak, and suggest that the next government, with the support of the parliament, will pursue a strict policy, and foreign relations might be repeated the same as the years 2009 to 2013 (Ahmadinejad's second administration) and 2018 until now (after the withdrawal of the Trump administration from JCPOA). Of course, they also doubt the seriousness of Western countries, especially the United States, in the negotiations to revive the JCPOA, citing new conditions, including Iran's missile capability and regional behavior, as a major obstacle to reaching a new agreement and the issue that Iran will resist the new terms.
On the contrary, some analysts, citing the fragile economic, social and political conditions of the country and the concerns ahead, see the next administration as inevitable from the continuation of negotiations until a new understanding is reached. These analysts believe that the issues of Iran's domestic and foreign policy are intertwined in a complex way, and an idealistic government has no choice but to accept the new conditions in dealing with the ceiling of facts, although the next administration will use other interpretations and concepts to justify its rotation. They also look at the revival of JCPOA in the context of regional and global developments, noting that Iran is not the only player in this field, pointing to the important role played by Russia and China in this regard.
The fact is that the emergence of such debates and disagreements is natural and endless; because with the transfer of governments and parliaments, changes always occur at different political levels, and Iran is no exception to this rule. The change in Iran's foreign and economic relations has been experienced many times under the influence of the results of previous presidential and parliamentary elections and will be the same in the future.
However, it seems that this disagreement stems from the fact that each approach takes into account some of the facts and ignores the two basic rules of foreign policy in Iran. In other words, if these analysts were to look closely at the basis of Iran's foreign policy and relations, they would explain the reason for Iran's sinusoidal behavior more accurately and clearly for at least the past three decades, and such changes were sometimes not surprising. These two rules are: First, Iran's foreign policy and relations must be understood within the framework of the system and the hard core of power, and not the government and parliament; Second, for at least the past three decades, it has become clear that the management of domestic affairs and the pursuit of Iran's goals at the regional level are tied to "controlled insecurity." In fact, knowing these two rules help us to understand why the change in the executive and the legislative institutions do not lead to a dramatic and continuous change in Iran's foreign affairs, and as if some problems must survive.
Regarding the first rule, few people today doubt that decision-making about neighbors and the Middle East has nothing to do with official bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and their duties and powers are limited to a formal announcement and possibly administrative follow-up. Of course, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the specialized parliamentary commission / committee in other countries are also considered as one of the few effective bodies in the field of foreign policy and relations, but it seems that these two institutions have lost their influence in Iran for a long time. The determination of regional policies is done in the context of the analysis of military and security institutions and elites, and even they are often responsible for the implementation of those policies. Now, the second rule will be explained as follow.
It seems that the increase in economic and social problems in the country and at the same time the endless political pressures have caused a feeling of fatigue and increased public dissatisfaction. The most important public protest took place during the riots in January 2018 and November 2019, and besides, it is said that the number of investors and educated people migrating from the country has increased significantly. In recent years, there has been less of an issue that has not become a point of public opposition, even through gossip and jokes. It is clear that managing this situation and curbing growing dissatisfaction with bureaucratic burnout, as well as with the youth population and cultural and lifestyle changes in Iran, has become more difficult than ever. The political system has no choice but to submit to reform in order to improve its performance and respond to the demands and pressures of society, unless it can provide a good excuse to restrain society and replace it with the reconstruction of legitimacy. Global and regional experience shows that the existence of a percentage of crisis and insecurity is the best excuse that in the absence of legitimacy becomes an opportunity for survival.
At the same time, Iran's foreign relations are dramatically tied to heavy competition and sometimes proxy conflicts with other regional powers, and calm in this area has practically become a dream. As we know, in recent years Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Yemen have become the scene of open competition and conflict between Iran and other countries in the region, all based on a common and similar perception of possible changes in the political map of the Middle East and They are looking for their security in another parts' weakening and destruction, so that they have pursued an aggressive policy. This is why common problems and concerns, such as ISIS or the water crisis or migration, do not provide a basis for dialogue and conflict reduction, and instead any attempt to improve the situation is met with practical disruption and opposition from the other side. It is true that regional rivalries have taken on a new nature and intensified after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc, the problem is that there is less conflict in the region of which Iran be not an active party.
The important point in this approach is that the relative independence of the two domains of "domestic policy" and "foreign policy" is lost in practice, and the control of each domain is closely related to the way it acts in the other domain. In other words, experience shows that the political system tries to control its problems in one area by taking action in another area. That is why efforts have been made to improve foreign relations, even with the United States, in the four administrations of Hashemi Rafsanjani, Khatami, Ahmadinejad, and Rouhani, and we have seen an increase in obstruction in the path of the four governments in this area. In other words, whenever these governments have made an "excessive effort", they have been pushed back and constrained by the actions of other institutions. Both modes of improvement or degradation have been in line with domestic conditions, so that the demands or pressures of society do not exceed the "limit".
Therefore, insecurity and crisis-making, both internally and externally, must be manageable; Not so weak that the excuses for the security performance of the system disappear and not so strong as to disrupt the life of the system. This is what makes the policies of the political system more complex and, of course, more flexible if necessary and government agents are solely responsible for interpreting and justifying it. Neither closed domestic policies nor rigid foreign positions have any authority for policymakers and the hard core; If necessary, open or closed space is followed inside, and if necessary, external relations are reduced or improved, and of course, all within a framework that can be controlled.
Now, what can increase the success of a controlled insecurity policy is the principle of suspension; That is, in situations where internal and external problems are concentrated and there is no ability or possibility for coherence and consensus, its use is on the agenda to create some kind of confusion on the other side and possibly more time. Therefore, different issues are constantly linked to each other and excuses are raised after excuses so that no action can be taken.
Interestingly, all of these situations, although interpreted with ideological implications, are in fact influenced by internal and external realities and for a real purpose (system preservation), and this is the goal that shapes changes in Iran's foreign policy and sinusoidal activities in this area. So what can perpetuate or change the state of Iran's foreign activities in the coming months and even years is simply a sense of danger to the survival of the system, much of which is conveyed by actors such as Russia and China.
