Interview with Fereydoun Majlesi by Iranian International Relations Journal
Fereydoun Majlesi, in an interview with Iranian International Relations Journal, suggests that Mosaddegh's actions, which deviated from the mission of nationalizing the oil industry and instead focused on consolidating power, played a significant role in the events leading up to August 19, 1953.
Iranian International Relations Journal - Rouhollah Souri: Even after more than seventy years, August 19 remains a contentious topic in Iran, with supporters and opponents passionately debating its implications. What is necessary in this context is a critical and unbiased perspective that not only helps in accurately understanding history and its lessons but also paves the way for the future.
Majlesi presents a view that may not align with the dominant narrative regarding the events of August 19. He argues that Mosaddegh’s actions, such as purging the military, taking control of the judiciary, stripping the parliament of its legislative powers, ultimately shutting down the National Assembly, and the resurgence of the Tudeh Party along with military officers supporting the coup, were pivotal in leading to the coup. According to Majlesi, the nationalization of the oil industry eventually became a power struggle, influenced by figures like Fatemi, aiming to depose the Shah. He also believes Mosaddegh allowed the Tudeh Party to operate freely to intimidate the U.S., and Fatemi even collaborated with them.
Majlesi’s key point is that while the U.S. and Britain favored a coup, the decision to execute it was made by Iranian officers, and the Shah opposed the coup until the parliament was dissolved. He asserts that the movement to nationalize the oil industry did not fail, but rather it was sabotaged, and the Tudeh Party contributed to Mosaddegh’s downfall.
- The history following the nationalization of the oil industry until the coup shows that the U.S. initially tried to mediate between Iran and the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, providing financial and military aid to Mosaddegh’s government on several occasions. However, gradually, circumstances led the U.S. to one of its most significant interventions in the Middle East at that time. The question is, what pushed the U.S. to carry out the coup? And how did internal events in Iran influence the U.S. decision? Could the coup have been avoided?
Majlesi challenges the assumption that the U.S. was driven to execute the coup, suggesting instead that the U.S. was more interested in supporting a group of Iranian officers planning a coup rather than leading it themselves. The dismissal of Mosaddegh occurred two and a half years after the nationalization of oil, at a time when Mosaddegh had become the most popular prime minister due to widespread public support. After July 21, 1952 (30 Tir), Mosaddegh took control of the armed forces, purged the judiciary, and dissolved the parliament. These actions deviated from the mission of nationalizing the oil industry, leading to the complete shutdown of Iran's oil industry and the adoption of an economy without oil.
Majlesi suggests that personal animosity between Mosaddegh and the Shah, rooted in Mosaddegh’s disdain for Reza Shah, led to a desire to remove the Shah in a manner similar to how Reza Shah ousted Ahmad Shah. However, Mosaddegh's actions, such as taking control of the armed forces, the judiciary, and the legislature, contradict the principles of democracy in a society that was not ready for it at the time.
The military officers, motivated by personal interests and the growing influence of the Tudeh Party, which was seen as an agent of the Soviet Union, began to gather and plan the coup. The Tudeh Party's growing influence, especially after the Shah's assassination attempt, and its penetration into the military and police, further alarmed these officers.
- Did the Shah support the coup due to concerns about losing his throne, or was he merely a reluctant participant following the U.S. and British decisions?
Majlesi argues that when the nationalization of oil became a pretext for removing the Shah, it turned into a power struggle. Mosaddegh seemingly allowed the Tudeh Party to act freely to intimidate the U.S., and Fatemi cooperated with them. The conflict thus became both a power struggle and a fight against Soviet influence during the Cold War. The decision to execute the coup, favored by the U.S. and Britain, was made by Iranian officers, with the Shah resisting it until the parliament was dissolved. Over time, the Shah's resistance to Mosaddegh led to an increasing autocracy in the following years.
- What impact did the nationalization of the oil industry have on Iran's political and economic development? Should it be viewed positively or negatively?
The nationalization of oil was supported by the Iranian people, and after Mosaddegh, it became the foundation for Iran’s economic development. Although the oil industry was shut down for four years due to the insistence on not negotiating compensation, the subsequent benefits for Iran, such as economic growth, industrial development, and improved living standards, demonstrated the long-term advantages of the nationalization policy.
- After the coup, Iran signed the Consortium Agreement, binding it to sell oil to foreign companies for 25 years. How does this agreement relate to the nationalization law? Is it a departure from the law or a continuation?
Majlesi argues that the law of nationalization continued after Mosaddegh’s removal, and the agreement with the Consortium, which included compensation, was a continuation of that law. The Consortium’s role was to market and sell Iranian oil at the best global price, and over time, Iran successfully renegotiated terms to increase its share of the profits.
- How do you evaluate the U.S.'s role in advancing democracy in Iran? Was the U.S. a supporter of democracy or an obstacle?
Majlesi believes that the U.S. had no direct role in promoting democracy in Iran, as democracy requires cultural and educational development, which was lacking in Iran at the time. While the U.S. traditionally advocates for democracy, it often does so based on its own interests, and true democracy in Iran was hampered by widespread illiteracy and societal conditions.
- The 2022 protests in Iran have once again intensified the debate among supporters and opponents about the role of foreign countries in supporting protest movements. As a final question, what lessons can the 1953 coup offer for the current protest movement in Iran? If we were to go back to those days, what could have been done to prevent the course of events from leading to a coup? Some believe that concerns about being labeled as compromising with the West prevented Mossadegh from agreeing to oil proposals, including the World Bank's proposal. To what extent do you find this view accurate? One of the influential parties and groups in the developments of those years was the Tudeh Party. How do you view the role of the Tudeh Party in the failure of the nationalization movement of oil? Religious authorities and scholars have played an important role in Iran's developments since the Constitutional Revolution. Despite the fact that during the Constitutional Revolution we witnessed the positive stance of many top-ranking clerics in support of the revolution, a few decades later during the nationalization of oil and the 1953 coup, not only do we not see such a stance from the religious authorities and clerics, but on the contrary, we see opposition to Mossadegh and even the support of some clerics (such as Behbahani, the son of Ayatollah Behbahani, who was a staunch supporter of the Constitutional Revolution) with the coup plotters, or at best, we witness the silence of the clerics. From your perspective, how should the lack of support from the clerics for the nationalization of oil be analyzed?
Foreign countries, due to their grievances against Iran and concerns about the extremist actions that led to U.S. and international sanctions on Iran, naturally support any protest in Iran. This is unrelated to the domestic protesters receiving external support and should not be used as an excuse for suppressing them. The rulers should also consider that the social and cultural conditions of the country have changed significantly compared to half a century ago. Now, more than 90% of the population has basic literacy, and more than 50% have social and practical literacy. In the past, women's illiteracy was the main problem and a cause of social backwardness; now, the literacy rate among women has even surpassed that of men. The revolution enjoyed more than 89% support, but gradually, due to the impacts of war and social restrictions, this support diminished. The ruling fanatic group, which once behaved like occupiers towards an alienated people, severely damaged that popularity and replaced respect with fear and obedience. Social channels also expose and inform the public about many of the common corruptions and wrongdoings. In any case, the people evolve along with the world, and the rulers must either adapt to this transformation or face destructive resistance that is not beneficial for society.
August 19th (28 Mordad) was a severe reaction from the Iranian military, supported by the West during the Cold War, a West that had its strategic interests. The reason for resorting to a coup, whether the name has changed or not, was the deadlock of the government. In such deadlocks, coups become inevitable. Ahmad Shah was also at a deadlock on February 21, 1921 (3 Esfand 1299). The shutdown of the oil industry, the lack of other sources of revenue, the depletion of the treasury, the secret printing of banknotes! Not accepting the World Bank's temporary management proposal was a disaster. The reason for this was the ignorance of Hassibi and Fatemi. Not accepting the joint U.S.-British proposal as the final word was also reckless. What did they want? For Iran to take over the management of the industry itself, operate it, and sell it! The disagreement was an excuse for a power struggle. Fear of damaging prestige in case of an agreement with the West is meaningless. The customer and the financial and industrial capabilities were only in the West. It was a deadlock, and most of Mossadegh's supporters were salaried individuals who didn't realize that their salaries were being paid by printing banknotes and were not significantly affected by the crisis, but the working classes and the struggling, jobless people were in misery and despair, and when they joined the reinforced revolt, their numbers swelled.
In my opinion, the nationalization movement of oil did not fail. It was sabotage and incompetence that failed, and the Tudeh Party contributed to Mossadegh's defeat, but the nationalization of oil was victorious! In my view, the only role that the U.S. could have played on August 19th was related to the U.S. agreement to a ceasefire in the Korean War, which occurred a few days before August 19th, and could have led to the Soviet Union agreeing or being compelled to order the withdrawal of Tudeh Party forces and cadres from the streets of Tehran. The Tudeh Party practically controlled the city's affairs, but suddenly, at the party's order, which could not have been without the Soviet embassy's permission, they vacated the streets, apparently on Mossadegh's order, and paved the way for the passage of 27 tanks from the Aqdasiyeh barracks, ending the operation. U.S. Ambassador Henderson himself arrived in Tehran from Beirut on August 18th, and in the evening of August 18th, after his last meeting with Mossadegh, Mossadegh told his supporters to clear the streets! Henderson says that day, I no longer called Mossadegh Prime Minister! Because I had a copy of the dismissal order that had been received by Ardeshir Zahedi in my pocket. I asked, "Dr. Mossadegh, has the Shah issued your dismissal order?" Mossadegh first denied it, then added that even if he had, since I consider it illegal, I would not have implemented it. (U.S. secret documents, August 18, 1953)
Regarding the role of the clergy, who were still under the influence of the Constitutional Revolution's atmosphere, it must be said that Kashani and Behbahani supported the nationalization movement of oil and were instrumental in its victory. In fact, they played the main role in bringing the field elements to the streets during the July 21st (30 Tir) uprising. However, they opposed Mossadegh's seizure of legislative powers and believed they should have a role and share in the government, but Mossadegh, with his stubbornness and intransigence, had no one by his side except a group of loyal followers. The growing concern about the Tudeh Party's visibility and communist ideas was also a priority for the clergy.
As for what Mossadegh should have done to avoid that fate, perhaps it can be said that he should not have forgotten his oil mission and should not have taken on an unsupported mission in matters that led to his defeat. He should have negotiated with the British and reached an agreement on compensation with Iranian bargaining. In the meantime, he should have accepted the temporary management of the World Bank. He should have accepted the final joint proposal from Eisenhower and Churchill within the established 50-50 framework. Despite being a general and a Republican, Eisenhower was very moderate and reasonable. Even the 50-50 principle was later overturned, and then Iran signed its first 75-25 agreement on its continental shelf in the Persian Gulf with the Pan American company. The lesson is that a government should never reach a deadlock and desperation, opening the door to a coup and the military.
The situation of the group huddled in the basement of Mossadegh's house, listening to the news of the August 19th army advance and rebellion on the radio, was pathetic. Raising the white flag of surrender and fleeing to a neighbor's house was not an honorable end to a struggle that had created the greatest national unity among Iranians. But oil was nationalized, and at one time, the National Iranian Oil Company had become the largest oil company.
Editorial Board of Iranian Journal of International Relations
August 17, 2024
